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“A publike weale is a body lyvyng.”1 So claimed Sir Thomas Elyot on the opening page 
of The Book Named the Governor, published in 1531; the “Public weal” here meaning 
the common-weal or commonwealth: the res publica. Elyot’s political theories were 
heavily influenced by Aristotelian ideals of civic republicanism. Indeed, the anatomical 
metaphor with which to describe the nature and formulation of the State, and the 
relationship therein between governor and governed, is traceable at least as far back as 
The Politics of Aristotle, in Book V of which he cautions against the exponential growth 
of any part of the State: “The body consists of parts, and all increase must be in 
proportion, so that the proper balance of the whole may remain intact, since otherwise 
the body becomes useless.”2  
My concern in this essay is to explore the development and manipulation of the 
anatomical image in the context of early modern English jurisprudence. I am especially 
interested in the apparent fusion of classical, natural law theory with the tenets of 
Judaeo-Christianity, thereby creating a hybrid image of a body politic, derived as much 
from classical texts as it is from the pages of the Bible. To borrow a phrase from 
Foucault (discussing the tragic fate of Actaeon, as related in Book III of Ovid’s 
                                                        
* School of Law, University of Warwick, UK. I am grateful to Hart Publishing for granting me permission 
to incorporate brief extracts from Paul Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution: Late Elizabethan 
Politics and the Theatre of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
1 Sir Thomas Elyot, The boke named the Governour (London: T. Bertheleti, 1531), sig, Ar. 
2 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair (London: Penguin, 1992), 303, Bk V.III.1302b33. 
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Metamorphoses): “in the complicity of the divine with sacrilege, some of the Greek 
light flashed through the depths of the Christian night.”3 In creating such an image, 
simultaneously Christian and pre-Christian, the English jurists of the early modern 
period were demonstrably adhering to the Ciceronian maxim (quoted by Sir Edward 
Coke on the title page to Part I of The Reports): “law is unerring reason, adhering to a 
divine purpose.”4  Reason and divinity were perceived by Coke and his judicial brethren 
to be coextensive and indivisible facets of the common law.    
Sir John Fortescue, the Lancastrian Chief Justice (and Lord Chancellor in exile) 
during the turbulent reign of King Henry VI, located the source of law’s creation in the 
Judaeo-Christian deity, claiming in his De Laudibus Legum Angliae (written around 
1470, but not published in English until 1567),5 that “Laws which are made by Men, 
(who for this very End and Purpose receive their Power from GOD) may also be 
affirmed to be made by GOD.”6 The claim to divine provenance notwithstanding, 
Fortescue was adamant that English law is derived simultaneously from the law of 
nature. He quotes from Book V of Aristotle’s The Nicomachean Ethics as authority for 
his claim that the law of nature is the ultimate fount of English law: “‘The Law of 
Nature is the same, and has the same Force all the World over’”.7 Of equal relevance 
to Fortescue’s claim that the foundations of common law are rooted in natural law is 
                                                        
3  Michel Foucault, Aesthetics: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. J.D. Faubion, 3 vols. 
(London: Penguin, 2000), 2:125. 
4 “Lex est certa ratio e mente divina manans,” Part 1 (1602) of The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt. In 
English, ed. George Wilson, 7 vols. (London: Rivington, 1777), 1:title page.  
5 Robert Mulcaster’s English translation of De Laudibus Legum Angliae was published in 1567 under 
the title A Learned Commendation of the Politique Lawes of England. 
6 Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae, ed. John Selden (London, R Gosling, 1737), 5. 
7 Fortescue, De Laudibus, 29; Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics bk V.VII.1134b18-20. 
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the assertion of Cicero that “True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of 
universal application, unchanging and everlasting...” 8  Cicero’s encomium to the 
immutable within time, to the congruency of nature and human reason, and therefore to 
the primacy of natural law, was adopted by early modern common lawyers as a dictum 
which validated the claim to jurisdictional hegemony for a legal system predicated not 
upon statute, but upon recta ratio or right reason, as reflected in the customary laws of 
England.  
Fortescue describes in considerable anatomical detail the form of the English 
body politic, noting the linguistic and symbolic connection between laws and 
ligaments:  
 
The Law, under which the People is incorporated, may be compared to the 
Nerves or Sinews of the Body Natural; for, as by these the whole Frame is fitly 
joined together and compacted, so is the Law that Ligament (to go back to the 
truest Derivation of the Word, Lex à Ligando) by which the Body Politic, and all 
its several Members are bound together and united in one entire Body.9  
 
Coke used identical imagery in his report of Postnati. Calvin’s Case, published in Part 7 
of The Reports in 1608, in order to describe the relationship between king and subject: 
“As the ligatures or strings do knit together the joints of all the parts of the body, so doth 
ligeance join together the Sovereign and all his subjects.” 10  The Italian jurist, 
                                                        
8 “Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna...”: Marcus 
Tullius Cicero, De Republica in De Re Publica, De Legibus,  trans. Clinton W. Keyes (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1928), 211, Bk. III.XXII.33. 
9 Fortescue, De Laudibus, 22. 
10 Coke, Postnati. Calvin’s Case, 7 Reports (1608), 4:1a, at 4b.  
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Giambattista Vico, also noted in La Scienza Nuova (published in 1725), that the words 
for law derive from those for tendons or cords. Commenting on Vico, George Hersey 
observed that the Italian word “corda” translates variously as a tendon, a harmonious 
musical sound, and the string of a lyre.11 The Greek nomos means both “tune” and “law,” 
and Plato employed the pun on nomos throughout The Laws, for example in his assertion 
that “After the ‘prelude’ [the preliminary analysis of the State] should come the ‘tune’, 
or (more accurately) a sketch of a legal and political framework.”12 There is much to say 
about the correlation between musical harmony and the constitution of the ideal State, of 
the relevance to the origins of law of the myth of Orpheus, and of Cicero’s insistence that 
“What the musicians call harmony in song is concord in a State, the strongest and best 
bond of permanent union in any commonwealth.”13 But that is for another essay. For now, 
I wish merely to observe the correlation between musical harmony and the Platonic idea 
of justice (or dikaiosunê) as being inextricably linked to the notion of harmonious 
relations between the State and the individual, and between fellow citizens of the State. 
The relationship between musical harmony and the making of good laws is a 
recurring theme in The Laws. Writing about the legal regulation of music in the 
Athenian democracy, Plato describes a “kind of song too, which they thought of as a 
separate class, and the name they gave it was this very word that is so often on our lips: 
‘nomes’ (‘for the lyre’, as they always added).”14  
                                                        
11 George Hersey, The Lost Meaning of Classical Architecture: Speculations on Ornament from Vitruvius 
to Venturi (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 5. 
12 Plato, The Laws, trans. Trevor J. Saunders (London: Penguin, 2004), 156, Bk V.IX.734e; see also, 
Plato, The Laws, 513, n 1. 
13 Cicero, De Re Publica, 183, Bk II.XLII.69. 
14 Plato, The Laws, 107–108, Bk III.V.700b. 
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The association of the lyre with the harmonious governance of society 
remained a central image in the iconography of common law during the early 
modern period. The musical metaphor of the stringed instrument was employed by the 
Elizabethan divine, Richard Hooker, with reference to the nature of kingship. In Of the 
Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Hooker aligned Christian theology with an Aristotelian 
model of community. 15  The co-existence of Church and State is a central tenet of 
Hooker’s communitarian ethos. In the ideal commonwealth that Hooker describes, the 
monarch is the unifying figure that links the Church in an indivisible bond with the people. 
Crucially, the subject of power in Hooker’s commonwealth is not the monarch in person 
but the “body of the commonwealth.”16 In such a polity, “where the King doth guide the 
state and the law the King, that commonwealth is like an harp or melodious instrument.”17 
Hooker’s allusion to the musical harmony of Orpheus’s lyre demonstrates the potency of 
classical mythology and the resonance of its images in the imaginations of early modern 
writers. As Hersey has noted, the myth of Orpheus and the lyre “records the moment 
when law was first introduced into the society that invented that myth.”18 
                                                        
15 On the influence of Aristotle over the political theory of Hooker, see Tod Moore, “Recycling Aristotle: 
The Sovereignty Theory of Richard Hooker,” History of Political Thought 14.3 (1993): 345-359. 
16 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, ed. Arthur S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 179, Bk VIII.6.1. 
17 Hooker, Of the Laws, 146, Bk VIII.3.3; on Hooker’s subjection of the monarch to the interests of 
society, see Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from 
Whitgift to Hooker (London: Unwin Hymen, 1988), 109, 201. 
18 Hersey, Lost Meaning of Classical Architecture, 5. George Puttenham wrote that “Orpheus assembled 
the wilde beasts to come in heards to harken to his musicke, and by that meanes made them tame, 
implying thereby, how by his discreete and wholsome lessons uttered in harmonie and with melodious 
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It is axiomatic of any discussion concerning the early modern body politic that 
reference is made to Ernst H. Kantorowicz’s magnum opus: The King’s Two Bodies. 
Respectful though I am of the depth of scholarship exhibited by Kantorowicz, of the 
magisterial scope of the book, and of its lasting influence over the work of subsequent 
generations of scholars, I must take issue with some of the claims made by Kantorowicz 
in the interests of discerning the true balance between temporal and spiritual powers, 
and in configuring the constitutional relationship between governor and governed. 
Kantorowicz quotes from Fortescue’s De Dominio Regali et Politico19 in support of his 
thesis that the Lancastrian Chief Justice was proposing that the king shared with “the 
holy sprites and angels” certain mystical powers. Kantorowicz claims that “Elizabethan 
jurists ‘borrowed’ from Fortescue,” in elucidating the theory that the king was 
possessed of two bodies: the body natural and the body politic.20 In particular he makes 
an explicit link between Fortescue’s assertion that the angels do not “grow old” and 
Plowden’s report of the Case of the Dutchy of Lancaster, in which the great law-reporter 
wrote that the body politic of the king “is utterly void of infancy, and old age.”21 
Arguably, it is conjectural in the extreme to correlate an Elizabethan law report with a 
                                                        
instruments, he brought the rude and savage people to a more civill and orderly life,” George Puttenham, 
The Arte of English Poesie (London: Richard Field, 1589), 4.  
19 De Dominio Regali et Politico was published in 1715 as Difference Between an Absolute and Limited 
Monarchy, and in 1885 under the title The Governance of England. 
20 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1957), 8. 
21 Sir John Fortescue, “The Governance of England” in On the Laws and Governance of England, ed. 
Shelley Lockwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81-123, 95; Case of the Dutchy of 
Lancaster in The Commentaries or Reports of Edmund Plowden, 2 vols. (Dublin: H. Watts, 1792), 1:212, 
213. 
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work written approximately ninety years earlier, purely on the basis that both texts refer 
to the process of ageing. Insofar as the power of the king resembles character 
angelicus,22 the mystical quality of kingship is reflected in its suggestive capacity for 
good: the king acts at all times in the interests of res publica. This observation should 
be central to any discussion of Fortescue’s delineation of positive powers and what he 
terms impotent “non-powers”23: kings and angels exercised only the former. Nowhere 
in De Dominio does Fortescue claim for the king the metaphysical status of character 
angelicus. At most he asserts that, like the angelic choir, the institution of monarchy is 
a power for good; as such, it is incapable of sin, ageing or sickness. Using a Biblical 
analogy, with appropriate references both to Old Testament sources and St. Thomas 
Aquinas’s On Princely Government, Fortescue attributes to the judiciary a level of 
dominion within the constitution that was antithetical to the absolutist pretensions of 
Richard II and his Tudor (and early Stuart) successors: 
 
The children of Israel, as Saint Thomas says, after God had chosen them as ‘his 
own people and holy realm’, were ruled by Him under Judges ‘royally and 
politically’, until the time that they desired to have a king such as all the gentiles, 
which we call pagans, then had, but they had no king but rather a man who reigned 
upon them ‘only royally’. With which desire God was greatly offended, as well 
                                                        
22  Kantorowicz cites only one Biblical source for the claim to monarchic character angelicus: the 
reference is less than authoritative, being the opinion expressed by the woman of Tekoah to King David, 
i.e. “for as an angel of God, so is my lord the king to discern good and bad” and “my lord is wise, 
according to the wisdom of an angel of God,” 2 Samuel 14.17, 20 (Authorised King James Version of 
The Bible). 
23 Fortescue, “The Governance of England,” 95. 
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for their folly, as for their unkindness since they had a king, which was God, who 
reigned upon them politically and royally.24 
 
Fortescue concludes his republican meditation in De Dominio with the thought that, 
according to Aquinas, the prince who rules in accordance with political and royal 
dominion is less likely to “fall into tyranny” than one who rules by royal dominion 
alone.25 
While Fortescue’s political thought was undoubtedly informed by prevailing 
ideas in late medieval theology, Kantorowicz ignores the fundamental tenet of De 
Dominio, which is the secular observation that the ideal of kingship is predicated upon 
“dominium politicum et regale,” rather than on dominium regale alone.26 The parity 
between “regal” and “political” establishes Fortescue’s work as a Bractonian 
interpretation of limited monarchy: “The king must not be under man but under God 
and under the law, because law makes the king.”27 Noting the similarity to Bracton, 
Alan Cromartie notes that “What readers found in Fortescue, however, was 
unimpeachable authority – the word of a Chief Justice – for a range of near-republican 
opinions.”28 I would go farther than Cromartie, and argue that Fortescue’s opinions 
                                                        
24 Fortescue, “The Governance of England,” 84. 
25 Fortescue, “The Governance of England,” 84. 
26 Fortescue, “The Governance of England,” 83. 
27 “Ipse autem rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem” Henry de 
Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (c. 1235), trans. Samuel E. Thorne, 4 vols. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press, 1968–77), 2:33. 
28 Alan Cromartie, The Constitutionalist revolution: An Essay on the History of England, 1450-1642 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 21.  
 9 
were not “near-republican,” but totally republican – if by “republican” we mean not 
anti-monarchist (which Fortescue patently was not), but rather that which represents 
the best interests of the common-weal…or res publica. The word “political” is used by 
Fortescue to imply not only the consent of Parliament, but also the guidance and wise 
counsel of the judiciary, who perform a rabbinical or didactic role. Fortescue described 
the judges of the common law as “Sacerdotes, (Priests): The Import of the Latin Word 
(Sacerdos) being one who gives or teaches Holy Things.” 29  De Laudibus, an 
impassioned apologia for the English legal profession and the common law, ensured 
Fortescue’s lasting talismanic status among common lawyers. But it was his elevation 
of the judiciary to something approaching supreme constitutional authority, which 
probably endeared him most to lawyers of the Elizabethan period. Insofar as the 
common law was, according to Fortescue and all early modern jurists, of divine origin, 
then it is fair to state that the judiciary gave or taught “Holy Things.” But in their 
application of municipal law, they were more concerned with what Sir Edward Coke 
described as “the artificial reason and judgment of law,”30 than with metaphysical 
speculation over the mystical quality of monarchic authority. This is demonstrated most 
clearly in those cases from the 1560s, reported by Plowden, in which the matter of the 
king’s two bodies was discussed in court, and to which Kantorowicz refers in his book.  
The selective use of quotations from Fortescue and (especially) Plowden serves 
well the argument of Kantorowicz that the mystical nature of the king’s body politic 
came to dominate judicial thought in Elizabethan England, but this is not an accurate 
picture of the juridical landscape in relation to the resolution of disputes concerning 
                                                        
29 Fortescue, De Laudibus, 4-5. 
30 Coke, Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Reports (1655), 7:64a, 65a. 
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real property (the cases on which Kantorowicz concentrates in The King’s Two Bodies). 
It is more accurate to suggest that spiritual imagery provided the means through which 
temporal ends were attained. In the Case of the Dutchy of Lancaster, heard in 1561, the 
salient issue of law was whether the Crown was bound by the terms of a lease made by 
King Edward VI during his minority. The decision of the court that Elizabeth I could 
not avoid the terms of the lease made by her half-brother, “by reason of his nonage,” 
was based upon the metaphysical phenomenon of the king’s two bodies: “what the king 
does in his body politic cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any disability in his 
natural body.”31 But commentators tend to overlook the fact that the judges in this case 
employed the religious imagery of the conjoined bodies as a means of representing the 
secular principle that, like her subjects, the Queen was accountable to law, as 
interpreted by her judges. In Willion v Berkley (another case involving the grant of land 
by Edward VI), heard only a few months before the Case of the Dutchy of Lancaster, 
the argument that the body natural of the king was subsumed by the body politic was 
rejected by a majority of the judges; Justice Anthony Brown stating that “the person of 
the king shall not rule the estate in the land, but the estate in the land shall rule the 
person of the king.”32 These cases illustrate the manner in which the poetic imagination 
                                                        
31 Plowden, Case of the Dutchy of Lancaster, Commentaries, 1:213. 
32 Plowden, Willion v Berkley, Commentaries, 1:223, 245. Kantorowicz fails to note that in the earlier 
case of Hill v Grange (1556), “the argument of the king’s eternity, which he chooses to cite as an 
impressive ending to his chapter on Plowden, was actually rejected by the lawyers,” Lorna Hutson, “Not 
the King’s Two Bodies: Reading the ‘Body Politic’ in Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2” in 
Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe, eds. Victoria Kahn and Lorna Hutson (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 166-198, 177; Plowden, Hill v Grange, Commentaries, 1:164. 
 11 
of the judiciary was directed towards representing the constitutional theory of limited 
monarchy.33  
In Willion v Berkley, the Bractonian principle of a king subject to the law was 
firmly restated. Chief Justice Dyer argued there that the king’s subjects were “members” 
of the body politic: together with the king, “he and his subjects compose the 
corporation…and he is incorporated with them, and they with him.”34 Of course, Dyer’s 
definition of the body politic can be read as a secular interpretation of the corpus 
mysticum, but it must be conceded that he placed great emphasis on the status afforded 
the subject in determining the form of the “corporation” of the State. As Plowden 
reports unequivocally, “the whole court was of opinion [that] every subject has an 
interest in the king.”35 Dyer’s definition of an inclusive body politic implies a level of 
popular consent. In this respect, the body politic as defined in Willion v Berkley is more 
directly related to the consensual body politic described (more than 40 years later) by 
Coke in Calvin’s Case than to the more absolute model described by Plowden in the 
Case of the Dutchy of Lancaster. In the latter, the body politic is “constituted for the 
direction of the people”; while in the former “it is framed by the policy of man.”36 
                                                        
33 Given the exaggerated juridical importance with which Kantorowicz invests the theory of the king’s 
two bodies, it is noteworthy that in a later work he describes pre-modern judges in terms of their 
sovereignty and poetic judgments: see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, “The Sovereignty of the Legal Artist: a 
Note on Legal Maxims and Renaissance Theories in Art” in Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Selected Studies 
(New York: J.J. Augustin, 1965), 118. 
34 Plowden, Willion v Berkley, Commentaries, 1:234. 
35 Plowden, Willion v Berkley, Commentaries, 1:231. 
36 Plowden, Case of the Dutchy of Lancaster, Commentaries, 1:213; Coke, Postnati. Calvin’s Case, 7 
Reports (1608) 4:10a (emphasis added). 
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At the heart of Dyer’s judgment is the tacit assumption that conscience is an 
integral facet in the ideology and application of the common law. The influence of 
Christopher St. German’s Doctor and Student in particular, and the equitable tenets of 
renaissance humanism in general, are evident features of his judgment. He is describing 
an equitable system of justice, not necessarily in terms recognisable to the Court of 
Chancery (this was, after all, the Court of Common Pleas), but in the Aristotelian sense 
of judges as poets and sovereign artists applying the imaginary precepts of natural law 
to the tangible pragmatics of common law. The first of these precepts is that of doing 
good and avoiding evil. Willion v Berkley is especially notable for the moral distinction, 
made by Justice Anthony Brown, between right and wrong: his judgment embodied 
Aquinas’s first precept of law, outlined above, that “good is to be done and pursued, 
and evil is to be avoided.”37 
The theory of mystical kingship, of a monarch endowed with divine and 
irrefutable power, was one that the Plantagenet King Richard II had expounded. The 
religious devotion of Richard II and his emphasis on the divinity of kingship – “The 
deputy elected by the Lord” in Shakespeare’s Richard II38 – must be seen to a great 
extent as a response to the various rebellions and incursions upon the royal prerogative, 
which threatened his reign and eventually led to his deposition. But to argue as 
Kantorowicz does that the Elizabethan judges of the common law were united in their 
professional commitment to the theory of the king’s two bodies, and that such unity 
was represented in their various judicial decisions, is inaccurate.  In all of the cases in 
                                                        
37 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Pars Prima Secundae) (Teddington: The Echo Library, 
2007) 421, Q94, “Of the Natural Law.” 
38 William Shakespeare, King Richard II, ed. Charles R. Forker (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2002), 
3.2.53. 
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which the theory of the king’s two bodies is discussed, a majority of judges demonstrate 
adherence to an equitable doctrine, predicated upon the classical principle of epieikeia. 
Aristotle’s idea of equity was not bound by formalism: epieikeia, with its implications 
of fairness and equability, envisages the ideal good of society, in much the same way 
as Platonic dikaiosunê envisages right relations between men.39 Above all, most of the 
judges in the cases considered here demonstrated adherence to St German’s injunction: 
 
that thou do justice to every man as much as in thee is: and also that in every 
general rule of the law thou do observe and keep equity. And if thou do thus, I 
trust the light of the lantern, that is, thy conscience, shall never be extincted.40 
 
Of course, certain judges stood in awe of the king’s divine majesty, according 
the monarch a level of supra-legal power, which was antithetical to the limited powers 
invested in the king by Bracton and Fortescue. If, by way of conclusion, we jump 
forward from the 1560s to the 1630s, and to the trial of John Hampden in November 
1637 for his refusal to pay ship-money, we hear Sir Robert Berkeley declaring in 
judgment that “I never read nor heard that Lex was Rex, but it is common and most true 
that Rex is Lex, for he is Lex loquens, a living, a speaking, an acting law.”41 It was the 
characterisation of Charles I as the actual embodiment or personification of law, to 
which common lawyers and Parliamentarians were opposed: in the judgment to which 
                                                        
39 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Bks V.X.1137a30–1138a3, VI.XI.1143a19–1143b17. 
40 Christopher St. German, Dialogues Between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student in the Laws of England, 
ed. William Muchall (Cincinnati, Ohio: Robert Clarke, 1874), 44. 
41 Quoted in Samuel R. Gardiner, History of England, 10 vols. (New York: AMS, 1965), 8:278. 
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I refer above, Berkeley had appeared to mistake the body natural of Charles Stuart for 
the body politic of Charles I. In January 1649, eleven years after Hampden’s trial, the 
King found himself the defendant at his own trial in Westminster Hall. The indictment 
stated that he had been “trusted with a limited power to govern by and according to the 
laws of the land”; a trust which he had betrayed in favour of “a wicked design to erect 
and uphold in himself an unlimited and tyrannical power to rule according to his will, 
and to overthrow the rights and liberties of the people...” The King asked the court “by 
what authority he was brought thither?”42 Such a question returns us inevitably and 
finally to the matter of the king’s two bodies: the answer to the question posed by 
Charles I being that the king’s body natural was tried in the name of the king’s body 
politic. As Parliament declared in May 1642, even though judgment were given in the 
King’s courts “against the King’s Will and Personal command, yet are they the King’s 
Judgments.”43 To use the words of Kantorowicz himself: in January 1649 Parliament 
tried, convicted, and sentenced to death “the king’s body natural without affecting 
seriously or doing irreparable harm to the King’s body politic.”44 Whether it was St. 
Paul, in 1 Corinthians, describing the Christian commonwealth on earth as “many 
members, yet but one body”,45 or Thomas Hobbes in 1651, invoking the image of the 
                                                        
42 The Trial of Charles the First, King of England, before the High Court of Justice, ed. John Nalson 
(Oxford: R. Walker and W. Jackson, 1746), 24, 25, 28. 
43 Quoted in Kantorowicz, King’s Two Bodies, 21. 
44 Kantorowicz, King’s Two Bodies, 23. 
45 The First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians 12.20. Coke adapted a passage from 1 
Corinthians 2.9, with which to describe the momentous juridical status of Postnati. Calvin’s Case: “… 
such a one as the eye of the law (our books and book-cases) never saw, as the ears of the law (our 
reporters) never heard of, nor the mouth of the law (for judex est lex loquens) the Judges our forefathers 
of the law never tasted,” Coke, Postnati. Calvin’s Case, 7 Reports (1608) 4: 4a. The relevant passage 
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Biblical Leviathan with which to represent “The Matter, Forme, and Power of A 
Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil”46 – “His heart is as firm as a stone; yea, as 
hard as a piece of the nether millstone”47 – the image of the body was crucial to the 
development of the idea of the State; whether that State be exclusively temporal or 
spiritual, or composed of both temporal and spiritual parts.  
 
 
                                                        
from 1 Corinthians reads: “Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, 
the things which God hath prepared for them that love him”; see Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary 
Constitution, 147-149. 
46 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or, The Matter, Forme, and Power of A Common-Wealth, Ecclesiasticall 
and Civil (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651), title page. 
47 The Book of Job, 41.24; this verse is cited on the title page of the first edition of Leviathan. 
